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Introduction
It is not as if I had found any way out of this critical situation. Exactly not that. But
this critical situation itself became to me an explanation of the character of all
theology.
Be wary of those who proclaim a crisis. They may have suspect motives: they may be
seeking political support for measures that would not be countenanced in the absence
of crisis, or wanting the attention that comes with crying ‘Wolf!’ Or their judgement
may be faulty, falling into the trap of confusing a personal discovery with universal
truth, believing in ahistorical ignorance that the time they live in – and especially this
moment of crisis – is unprecedented, unique, and constitutes an emergency. And yet
in spite of all this politicking, false alarms, and historical ignorance, crises do occur.
If they did not, the politicians and attention seekers would have no audience. There
are critical turning points in the course of events when what we decide to do, or not
to do, has far-reaching consequences. And when such crises exist, it is of the utmost
importance to see them for what they are and address them in action. When we hear
someone announcing that we are in crisis, therefore, we are faced with a task of
discernment and decision. Is this instance one of the many when a crisis is named for
ulterior motives or out of ignorance, or is it one of those rare moments when the crisis
is significant, immediate, and requiring our attention?
This book proclaims not one crisis, but three, so should be treated especially warily.
The first is the crisis of German theology at the beginning of the twentieth century
in the face of the rise of Nazism, as identified by Karl Barth. The second is the
crisis of theological ethics at the beginning of the twenty-first century in the face
of postmodern uncertainty and fundamentalist certainty, as identified by Zygmunt
Bauman. The third is the crisis of the possibility of theology in the face of a God who
cannot be comprehended by us. For Barth, this third crisis was the root of the first, and
dialectical theology was his response. My argument is that this third crisis also
underlies the second, and that Barth’s response is illuminating for how we respond to
this second crisis.
Karl Barth proclaimed the first crisis with the publication in 1922 of the second
edition of his commentary on Paul’s Letter to the Romans. In it his readers found a
strident and uncompromising announcement of a crisis in theology, and in God’s
dealings with the world. Following the end of the Great War of 1914–18, and the
Bolshevik revolution in Russia, Barth pictured the world as a scarred battlefield in
which God was evident only in the craters God’s past actions had left. Faced with this
‘theology of crisis’, many were sceptical of the challenge Barth posed, and denied
both the existence of the crisis he identified, and the dialectical theology Barth
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proposed as a response. Others – about whom Barth was even more worried – saw
in this crisis something that accorded with their own experience, and became
enthusiastic followers of the new movement.
There are good reasons one might find the crisis Barth announced in 1922 of little
interest. First, the signalling of a crisis must be timely to be of use. Close to a century
on surely the emergency, if it existed at all, has now passed? We might seek to glean
some historical lessons from whether the crisis was genuine, and how people
responded to it, but in the absence of immediacy this would sustain the interest only of
the devoted specialist. Second, and more seriously, Barth himself sought to play down
the significance of this period of his work. In the preface to the fifth edition of 1926,
Barth wrote that he often wished he had not written the book, and in the preface to
the next edition two years later, he said that much of the book ‘was due to my own
particular situation at the time, and also to the general situation’.1 Barth’s theology
developed beyond the second edition of Romans, and one feature of this development
was his discovery of the absence of crisis in the work of Anselm. If Barth, therefore,
was content to leave this work behind in pursuit of a new theological project, it would
seem to be a good reason for us to do likewise.
My argument in this book shows that neither of these reasons is good enough to
justify setting aside consideration of Barth’s theology of crisis. In response to the
point that Barth left his theology of crisis behind, I claim that Barth’s ethical thought
cannot be understood adequately without the concepts of crisis and dialectic that he
developed in the 1922 Romans.2 Barth’s ethics has been found wanting by virtually all
those who have engaged with it. Most have complained at his resistance to the idea
that we can know God’s will for a situation in advance, claiming that his emphasis on
the divine command leads to a problematic occasionalism. Others have sought to
defend Barth by noting the many aspects of his thought that stress the unity of God’s
willing and the continuity of God’s commanding, but have thereby come close to
making Barth into one of the proponents of system in ethics he criticized so directly.
More recently others have claimed him as a postmodern theologian, and revelled in
the ‘contentless norm’of his ethics in Romans II.3 All of these positions miss a crucial
feature in Barth’s ethical thought: in consequence of the crisis proclaimed in 1922 we
can neither claim to be in full possession of God’s will for humankind – which would
be idolatry – nor give up on the attempt to discover it – which would be apostasy.
Instead we must recognize this crisis that confronts us and recognize the need to speak
dialectically, affirming the necessity of ethical reflection in congruence with God’s
xii Introduction
1 Romans II, 25 (XXXVII).
2 Barth was unhappy with any kind of separation between theology and ethics, since theology properly
begins and ends with human action, a vision that I share. I use phrases like ‘Barth’s ethical thought’ or
‘Barth’s ethics’ as shorthand for those aspects of this theology that bear most directly on the question
how the life of the church and the world may best be shaped in response to the grace of God.
3 See, for example, William Stacy Johnson, The Mystery of God: Karl Barth and the Postmodern
Foundations of Theology (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 161.
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will to guide our action, the impossibility of attaining it, and the danger of the attempt.
Agood reason that we should take an interest in the ethical aspects of Barth’s theology
of crisis, therefore, is that we cannot interpret Barth’s ethical thought properly without
recognizing that it is an ethics in crisis.
If my claim is right, that crisis and dialectic remain a crucial feature of Barth’s
ethical thought throughout his life, it should be clear that the fact that he first
proclaimed this crisis nearly a century ago does not weaken its claim on our attention.
The fundamental crisis is not particular to German theology coming to terms with its
nineteenth-century legacy after the First World War. It cannot be set aside as the
product of a personal or global situation – despite Barth’s occasional attempts to do
so. Instead, it expresses an inescapable feature of God’s relationship with the world
and the place of human beings in it. God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ puts all that
we think we know in question. In particular, it reminds us both of our freedom and
responsibility to attend to God’s will for us, and of the limitations on our ability to
exercise this freedom and responsibility. If ‘crisis theology’ is to be an accurate
description of Barth’s theology, we must recognize that the crisis to which it refers
is not a brief and local phenomenon in German theology at the beginning of the
twentieth century, but the ongoing crisis of how we understand and speak of our
relationship with the God we encounter in the person of Jesus Christ. Once we have
recognized this, it becomes clear that crisis theology is a valid description of Barth’s
theology in its entirety. In Barth’s own words, ‘It is not as if I had found any way out of
this critical situation. Exactly not that. But this critical situation itself became to me an
explanation of the character of all theology.’4 His work, from 1922 to its end and
despite his own erratic depiction of it, represents a sustained attempt to respond to this
crisis, and the fundamental structure that permits a response without dulling the sharp
edges of the problem is dialectic. Barth’s ethics in crisis is not merely of historical
interest, therefore, and is not only of interest to those seeking a better understanding of
his ethical thought as a whole. The crisis he proclaimed is one under which we also
stand, and we need theological accounts that do justice to it and attempt to respond
to it. This book argues that Barth’s dialectical theological ethics, first developed in
response to a crisis in theology at the beginning of the twentieth century, is a resource
for constructive accounts of theology and ethics facing crises of their own at the
beginning of the twenty-first.
Just as the significance of Barth’s theology of crisis for his ethical thought has
not been adequately appreciated, so it is also the case that the importance of ethics in
this aspect of Barth’s theology has not been recognized. Ethics is never, for Barth, a
secondary discipline, the mere application of theology that is naturally theoretical, but
is a fundamental part of the concerns that theology addresses and is addressed by.
This is especially clear in Romans II, where Barth cites the ethical question ‘What
Introduction xiii
4 Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, trans. Douglas Horton (London: Hodder &
Stoughton, 1929), 101 (Karl Barth, Das Wort Gottes und die Theologie (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag,
1929), 102).
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shall I do?’ as a key reason for embarking on theology, claims Paul’s theology is
oriented towards practice throughout, and argues that theology has failed in its task
if it does not lead to new knowledge about how to engage the world. Yet beyond
the recognition of the integral place of ethics in theology, ethics has a particular
significance in two aspects of Barth’s crisis theology. First, Barth sees ethics as
provoking the crisis. Its power lies in the way it generates innumerable questions
which only God can answer, in its persistent asking of questions that it refuses to
answer, in its questioning of all human activity and pretensions. But second, ethics is a
key reason that Barth’s theology, even in Romans II, remains genuinely dialectical,
rather than resting content with a thoroughgoing proclamation of God’s ‘No!’ and
God’s otherness from us. Ethics is the reason we cannot finally opt for the luxury of
such consistent formulations, because alongside putting everything in question, it
also reminds us of the need to decide what we are to do. For today, and tomorrow, we
must choose how to spend our time, what we will do, and what we will fail to do. If
these choices, and therefore the actions that follow them, are not to be meaningless,
there must be some way in which, however provisionally and tentatively, we can gain
an understanding of how we are to make them. Barth could not simply throw up his
hands in denial of the possibility of human knowledge and ethical action because he
was too well aware of the urgent needs in the world to which he and others were called
to respond. The significance of ethics for Barth’s theology, therefore, is not just in his
judgement that the two could not be separated, but also in the way that ethics both
provokes the crisis for theology, and sets parameters for responding to it.
The thesis that Barth’s theological strategy for living with the crisis in construing
our relationship with God might be of use in a constructive account of theological
ethics is threatened from at least two sides. First, there are many who believe that
Barth’s theology does not speak to the challenges that face contemporary theology: he
is too conservative, too orthodox, too misogynist, too much concerned with divine
sovereignty and too little concerned with creation in its human and non-human forms.
To these readers, I can only recommend becoming better acquainted with Barth, and
hope that this book may encourage such an improving of relations. To take one
example, Barth is well known for using the uncompromising language of divine
command in describing the way human beings should discern right and wrong, yet in
order to understand what he means by it, we must set aside almost everything we
associate with divine command ethics. In particular, while sometimes God’s will may
seem heteronomous, Barth insists that God’s command distinguishes itself from all
others in setting us free, being always ‘the granting of a freedom’, which does not
compel, but ‘bursts open the door of the compulsion’ under which we live. God’s
command frees us from being dominated by forces beyond ourselves. It is the word of
‘our true, best friend’ that ‘sets us on our feet’ and is against us ‘only insofar as we are
against ourselves’.5 As so often, the account Barth gives of divine command is a
xiv Introduction
5 CD II/2, 585–95 (648–61).
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wholesale revision of the tradition, but only a close acquaintance with his thought
makes this clear.
Barth has not always been well served by his interpreters: his theology and ethics
have been badly misrepresented both by ardent enthusiasts and by committed critics.
To be sure, there are occasions when one wishes he had said more, occasions when
one wishes he had said less, and occasions when one wishes he had said something
different – I am not recommending any form of uncritical ‘Barthianism’. Barth would
have been the last to believe his theological work was self-sufficient or in any sense
complete, and it is clear that his thought requires correction as well as supplement in a
number of areas. My modest proposal is that Barth is worth attending to on this issue,
and that we find in Barth’s theology resources that current accounts of theological
ethics stand sorely in need of, and that we are therefore ill-advised to ignore.
A second group who will be initially sceptical of the thesis that Barth’s account of,
and response to, this ongoing crisis may be useful are those who doubt that there is
any ongoing sense of crisis in Barth’s theology at all. There was once a consensus that
the crisis, complexity, and dialectic of Barth’s 1922 Romans were happily resolved by
1931 in his discovery of Anselm, and that his major work, the Church Dogmatics, has
moved beyond such problems. McCormack and others have recently disturbed this
tidy narrative, but the argument in this book that crisis and dialectic remain crucial
for interpreting Barth’s ethical thought in Church Dogmatics is a new one. The
parallel readings I present of the ethical components of Romans II and corresponding
sections of Church Dogmatics show not only the continuing importance of crisis and
dialectic in the ethics of the latter, but also how recognition of this feature of Barth’s
ethics solves problems in interpreting his ethical thought. On the one hand, this means
that those who welcomed Barth’s supposed conversion by Anselm to orthodox, non-
dialectical theology need to come to terms with a Barth for whom ethics remains
in crisis, as a problematic and perilous enterprise. We cannot discover in Barth the
stable and secure foundation for ethics that many seek: the claim to possess such
a foundation is the blasphemy of claiming to know the mind of God. On the other
hand, the disruption of the narrative of Barth’s development from dialectical to non-
dialectical theologian means that those who celebrate Barth’s Romans as precursor to
a postmodern, contentless ethic, while lamenting his later turn to ‘logocentrism’ must
also rethink their position. Just as God’s ‘Yes’ to humankind cannot be separated from
God’s ‘No’ in the dialectic of Church Dogmatics, so God’s ‘No’ cannot be seen
without God’s ‘Yes’ in his 1922 commentary on Romans. Instead, the two stand in
tension in both works: in both works Barth saw theological ethics as a profoundly
problematic but nonetheless inescapable enterprise.
There may be some who are surprised by my claim that there is a twenty-first-
century crisis in theological ethics, quite apart from the question of whether Barth
could be of help in overcoming it. I find one representation of the challenge that we
face in a passage from a novel at the beginning of the last century: Ford Maddox
Ford’s The Good Soldier. At the beginning of the book its narrator, John Dowell,
looks back at the disastrous history in which adultery and the threat of it have led to
Introduction xv
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the suicides of both his wife and his best friend, and to the insanity of the woman he
loves. Surveying the wreckage, he is left bemused:
At what, then, does it all work out? Is the whole thing a folly and a mockery? Am I
no better than a eunuch or is the proper man – the man with the right to existence –
a raging stallion forever neighing after his neighbour’s womankind?
I don’t know. And there is nothing to guide us. And if everything is so nebulous
about a matter so elementary as the morals of sex, what is there to guide us in the
more subtle morality of all other personal contacts, associations, and activities?
Or are we meant to act on impulse alone? It is all a darkness.6
Eighty years on, Zymunt Bauman gives a more prosaic expression to a similar
sentiment:
Ours are the times of strongly felt moral ambiguity. These times offer us freedom
of choice never before enjoyed, but also cast us into a state of uncertainty never
before so agonizing. We yearn for guidance we can trust and rely upon, so that
some of the haunting responsibility for our choices could be lifted from our
shoulders. But the authorities we may entrust are all contested, and none seems to
be powerful enough to give us the degree of reassurance we seek. In the end, we
trust no authority, at least, we trust none fully, and none for long: we cannot help
being suspicious about any claim to infallibility. This is the most acute and
prominent practical aspect of what is justly described as the ‘postmodern ethical
crisis’.7
The crisis in theological ethics is that we are not sure how to begin illuminating the
darkness to which Dowell bears witness, or how to resolve the ambiguity and distrust
of authority that Bauman describes. Frequently theologians have denied the existence
of such uncertainty with the claim that those who see nothing to guide them are
simply in bad faith, shutting their eyes to the obvious moral realities that surround
them. Another version of this response is to claim that true believers have ready
access to moral certainty, so that it is only the unbeliever who is left mired in
indeterminacy. The implausibility of either of these positions is clear to most people
within and without the church. With regard to the first, Dowell’s problem is not that he
is wilfully in bad faith, but that he is adrift, out of sight of any moral landmark. With
regard to the second, it is not necessary to have a wide acquaintance of church
members to know that moral confusion exists among those who believe, and in any
case Barth reminds us that to assert possession of certain knowledge of God’s will is
to forget our place.
Other theologians have been impressed by the novel features of the postmodern
landscape, and have not wanted to deny or diminish them. They look for a new way of
doing theology in this new environment, revelling in the ambiguity the conservatives
xvi Introduction
6 Ford Maddox Ford, The Good Soldier (1915; London: Penguin Books, 1946), 19.
7 Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 21.
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reject and setting aside the normative aspirations of theological ethics. Such
postmodern ethical theologizing is as implausible as its reactionary counterpart: the
task of ethics is to provide guidance to those asking urgently what they should do, and
a response that refuses the possibility of such an answer is not an alternative way of
doing ethics but the renunciation of it. It is obvious that what we need is to chart a path
that recognizes on one hand the experience of being without a moral compass and
finding traditional authorities deficient, while on the other hand not giving up on the
attempt to provide meaningful ethical guidance. It is less obvious, however, how this
is to be done. That is my characterization of the crisis that confronts theological ethics
at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the crisis I believe Barth’s dialectical
theology can help us address.
It may seem odd to respond to a contemporary ethical crisis with the suggestion
that we recognize that theologically ethics is inescapably bound up with crisis. It may
also seem a suggestion with exhausting implications: to be in a constant state of crisis
does not recommend itself as a pleasant prospect. I would say two things in response.
First, I do not think that a proper understanding of theological ethics can aspire to
get beyond crisis as a recurrent feature. This is partly because we do not hold the
will of God in our hands, and so must continually seek after it in new times and places.
It is also partly that the nature of ethics is that we are confronted by situations, and
must decide how to respond to them. Such moments of judgement often cannot
be postponed: they are crises in which we must decide what path to take, and in doing
so choose the persons we will become. There is no escape from the need to ensure
that the shape of our living fits our calling as children of God. Second, recognizing
that crisis is a recurrent feature of theological ethics does not mean that we are faced
with continuous revolution in our ethical thinking or in our lives. The God we have
come to know in Jesus Christ is faithful, and knows our nature as creatures with a
past and future, as well as a present. Our lives are historically extended, and while
there are times when we are called to sudden new realizations of ourselves and
our responsibilities, there are many vocations in which we must remain true to
commitments we have made. In our existence over time, therefore, there is both
continuity and discontinuity. Few crises force us back to square one – though we
cannot exclude this possibility – some will leave us concluding we are already
heading in the right direction, and most will cause a reorientation of some degree.
It may be helpful at the outset to clarify one of the key terms I will be discussing,
since its meaning has been many and varied in its journey from classical Greece to the
present via the Stoics, Kant, Hegel, and Marx. In the context of the dialogues of
Socrates related by Plato, dialectic is a means of interrogating beliefs in order to show
their inconsistencies. Kant used dialectic to describe the contradictory relationship of
scientific principles to concepts such as the soul. For Hegel, dialectic is a historic
process by which thesis and the corresponding antithesis are finally unified in a
synthesis. None of these captures the meaning of dialectic in the present context.
Throughout this work I use ‘dialectic’ to denote an unresolved tension between two
poles in which neither pole is adequate by itself to characterize fully the concept under
Introduction xvii
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discussion: in Barth’s words, two poles ‘as irreconcilable as inseparable’. To take an
example from physics, light can be described either as a wave or as a stream of
photons. In certain contexts it makes more sense to treat light as one or the other
of these two models, but neither wave nor photon stream adequately accounts for
the full range of its behaviour, and the two models are genuine alternatives: there is
a contradiction involved in saying light is both a wave and a stream of photons. There
is a dialectical relationship between the nature of light as wave and photon stream in
the sense I am using ‘dialectic’. The relationship between the divinity and humanity
of Christ is a more theological example: if we want to affirm both that Jesus Christ
was divine and that he was human, and if we accept that there is a contradiction
in affirming both at the same time, then the divine/human nature of Christ is
dialectical as I am using the term. Indeed, as we shall see, for Barth the dialectic
between Christ’s divinity and humanity is one key reason why all theology must bear
a dialectical shape.8
This book is in the first place an argument that Barth’s ethical thought is best
understood when we recognize that it remained structured by the crisis first evident
in Romans II, and in the second place an argument that contemporary theological
ethics needs to recognize the significance of Barth’s response to this crisis in order
to overcome its own. The core of the first argument is a textual comparison between
the ethics of Romans II and the ethics of the Church Dogmatics. While I chart the
main features of the development of Barth’s dialectic between the two texts in
Chapter 4, my primary focus is a close reading of the two texts in parallel, rather than
an attempt to map to development of Barth’s theology during the intervening years.
This approach has the advantage of illuminating striking continuities between the
texts, as well as some contrasts. Since the 1922 edition of Romans is the most
thoroughgoing statement of Barth’s theology of crisis, this methodology has the
virtue of attempting to make the case for continuity in Barth’s ethical thought at
potentially the hardest point. The weakness of the approach is that it is poorly suited to
giving reasons for changes in emphasis in Barth’s theology in comparison to a more
xviii Introduction
8 McCormack cites the distinction Michael Beintker makes between two types of dialectic. In a
‘supplementary’ dialectic, the stronger member overcomes the weaker, and there is movement from
opposition to reconciliation. In a ‘complementary’ dialectic, in contrast, the members stand over
against each other in opposition, and the only movement is back and forth between them without
progress (Michael Beintker, Die Dialektik in der ‘Dialektischen Theologie’ Karl Barths (Munich:
Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1987), 38–9, cited in Bruce L McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic
Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development, 1909–1936 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995),
162–3). According to Beintker, supplementary dialectic characterizes the 1919 Romans and
complementary dialectic the 1922 edition. This accords with the results of my survey: the dialectical
elements I have found in the second edition of Romans and in the Dogmatics are oppositional and thus
fall into Beintker’s ‘complementary’ category. Beintker’s term ‘complementary’, however, fails to
do justice to the oppositional tension in the relationship between the two poles of the dialectic. See
also Leonardo Boff, Ecology and Liberation: A New Paradigm, Ecology and Justice Series
(Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1995).
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historically based account. There is a wide range of studies with this emphasis,
however,9 and my primary interest is describing and evaluating Barth’s theological
ethics, rather than attempting to explain its origins.
Part I of this book treats the ethics of Romans II. In the first chapter, I set the book
in context, and explore Barth’s vision of the place of ethics in the midst of crisis.
Chapter 2 examines Barth’s treatment of particular ethical issues in Romans II, under
the headings of love and community, and war, peace, and revolution. In Chapter 3, I
examine some of the critical responses to the ethics of Romans II, and argue that they
miss crucial features of Barth’s dialectical account.
Part II looks beyond Romans II to the Church Dogmatics. In Chapter 4, I
summarize the way Barth discusses the themes of crisis and dialectic between
Romans II and the Church Dogmatics, before proceeding in Chapter 5 to examine the
place of ethics in the Dogmatics in the light of Romans. Chapters 6 and 7 compare
Barth’s treatment of the themes of love and community, and war, peace and revolution
in the Dogmatics with the results of Chapter 2.
Part III looks at the implications of appreciating the structural continuities between
the ethics of Romans II and the Dogmatics. Chapter 8 draws out the results of the
comparative survey of Part II, and sets out the framework for a new reading of Barth’s
ethical thought as inescapably dialectical. I conclude by arguing in Chapter 9, that this
interpretation of Barth’s ethics is a significant resource for contemporary constructive
accounts of Christian ethics.
Introduction xix
9 See, for example, Henri Bouillard, Genèse et Evolution de la Théologie Dialectique (Paris: Aubier,
1957); Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts, trans. John
Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976); John Cullberg, Das Problem der Ethik in der
Dialektischen Theologie, vol. 1 (Uppsala: A.-B. Lundequistska Bokhandeln, 1938); Theodore
Alexander Gill, Protestant Political Theory: The Political Problem in Some New Reformation
Theology (Zurich: University of Zurich, 1953); George Hunsinger, ‘Toward a Radical Barth’, in Karl
Barth and Radical Politics, ed. George Hunsinger (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976);
McCormack, Karl Barth’s Theology; Friedrich-Wilhelm Marquardt, ‘Socialism in the Theology of
Karl Barth’, in Karl Barth and Radical Politics, ed. George Hunsinger (Philadelphia: Westminster
Press, 1976); Robert E. Willis, The Ethics of Karl Barth (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971).
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